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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : CaseNo.20040637-CA 
WILLIAM DONALD CARTER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of reckless endangerment, a third degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Ann Boy den presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant was angry with his domestic partner. Two or three times, he 
accelerated his truck towards her and then slammed on the brakes at the last moment, 
each time stopping only inches away from her. Was evidence of this conduct sufficient 
to support a jury verdict that defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded, 
This brief will cite to the current version of the Utah Code when there have been 
no amendments relevant to defendant's claims. 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct could cause death or serious 
injury? 
Standard of Review. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict/5 the Court "find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely 
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable 
and unjust." State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, \ 8, P.3d (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with reckless endangerment, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112. R2. Because defendant had previously been convicted of a 
domestic violence offense, the offense was enhanced to a third degree felony. Id.; see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1 (West 2004). 
Trial was held. R66. After the State rested at trial, defendant moved to dismiss on 
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show recklessness. R66, 131:182. The 
court denied the motion. R66, 131:184. Defendant then testified. See R.67, 131:186-
206. 
The jury found defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to an 
indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years. R68, 109-11. The court suspended 
the prison term, placed defendant on probation for 36 months, and ordered defendant to 
serve 120 days in jail. R109-11. 
Defendant timely appealed. Rl 12. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant and Annett ("Annie") Baker had been living together for about eight 
months. R131:127-28. Annie was working two jobs, but defendant was unemployed. 
Id. at 197. Annie usually asked defendant to drive her to work. Id. at 129. 
On November 30, 2004, Annie awakened defendant in the early afternoon to ask 
him for a ride. Id. at 130. Defendant was angry because Annie had awakened him. Id. 
He was also angry about having to drive Annie to work. Id. at 131. He and Annie argued 
as they were driving. Id. When they were about twenty blocks from Annie's work, 
defendant pulled off the road and told Annie "to get the hell out." Id. at 132. Annie got 
out. Id. 
Annie began walking north along the east side of Redwood Road. Id. at 133-34. 
Defendant followed "really close" in his truck, "telling [Annie] to get back in the car." 
Id. at 133. He was "[s]creaming at [her], pulling up behind [her], pulling at the side of 
[her], telling [her] to get back in the car." Id. at 134. "He would say, Get in the car, 
bitch, I'll take you to work." Id. at 140. 
Defendant repeatedly sped up behind Annie so fast that "he'd have to slam on his 
breaks before he hit [her]." Id. at 138. He came close enough so that he could "clip [her] 
if he wanted to." Id. at 137. When he "slam[med] on his brakes," he would "slide a little 
bit" on the gravel shoulder. Id. at 138. Annie could hear the rocks and dirt flying. Id. 
At least two or three times, defendant's truck stopped no more than eight to twelve inches 
from her. Id. at 138-39. 
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Defendant followed her from about 20 South to 13 South, screaming and yelling 
the entire time. Id. at 141. Annie was frightened, "ducking behind telephone poles and 
stuff like that, because [she] thought he was trying to hit [her]." Id. at 139. Defendant 
had previously made threats about his driving and things he would do. Id. at 144. He 
had threatened to drive their vehicle "into a telephone pole and take [them] both out." Id. 
This day defendant had threatened, "[0]ne of us [i]s going to get hurt." Id. 
Moreover, defendant was driving a truck that was not working properly. Annie 
said the truck was idling high. Id. Defendant said the truck had an "accelerator 
problem." Id. at 195. He said that the "throttle got stuck" as he was driving Annie to 
work. Id. at 189. He had to pull over and turn off the key. Id. The problems continued. 
The truck "would start moving really quickly" when defendant would start it up. Id. at 
190. He could smooth it out when he got it into second gear, but he "[h]ad to turn the key 
off to stop it. Id. at 190, 195. 
After defendant had followed Annie to about 13 South, he pulled over to the side 
of the road and got out. Id. at 141. Annie, who was carrying a cell phone, had threatened 
to call the police if defendant did not leave her alone. Id. Defendant pulled Annie's hair 
as he grabbed the phone out of her backpack. Id. at 142. Defendant then returned to his 
truck, made a U-turn, and "headed off." Id. at 143. 
Annie continued walking to work. Id. at 164. Officers Boston and Webb found 
her at 1050 South Redwood Road. Id. An unidentified person had called the police to 
report "that a female was being chased by a male in a vehicle as she was walking down 
Redwood Road." Id. at 164, 166. Officer Boston talked with Annie, wrote up a report, 
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and gave Annie a ride to work. Id, at 165. Annie was "very concerned" about being late 
for work. Id. at 166. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence sufficed to support defendant's conviction for reckless 
endangerment. Specifically, defendant's abusive language, his jackrabbit stops and starts 
on the road's gravel shoulder, his coming within inches of Annie after slamming on the 
brakes, his knowledge that the car was working improperly, and his prior and concurrent 
threats to use the vehicle to hurt her all supported the jury's determination that defendant 
acted recklessly. The evidence supported the jury's verdict that defendant was aware that 
his conduct could seriously injure or kill Annie, but that he consciously disregarded the 
risk because he was angry and wanted to intimidate and punish her. The jury also 
properly concluded that the risk here—the use of an automobile as a projectile against an 
unprotected pedestrian—constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person in defendant's circumstances would have exercised. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT 
DEFENDANT ACTED RECKLESSLY 
Defendant claims that the State "failed to establish the mens rea of criminal 
recklessness," "an element of the offense." Br. Appellant at 5, 15. He claims that he "did 
not perceive his conduct to be a risk." Id. at 24. He contends that he had his truck under 
control and therefore "had no reason to perceive any risk to [Annie] when he drove up to 
her several times and stopped behind her." Id. at 19. Also, "[t]o the extent [he] should 
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have been aware of a substantial risk . . . he was not." Id. at 24. Thus, he claims, the 
evidence did not suffice to support the conviction. Id. at 6. 
Defendant "must overcome a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of 
evidence for a jury verdict." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ 10, 2 P.3d 954. 
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict," the Court "find[s] 
that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. 
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, f 8, P.3d (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
A. A person acts recklessly when he is aware of, but consciously disregards, a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk. 
"A person commits reckless endangerment if. . . the person recklessly engages in 
conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person." 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-112(1) (West 2004). 
A person acts recklessly "with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct.. . when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist." Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-103(3) (West 2004). 
"The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Id. 
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This Court has stated that "[determining whether a person acts recklessly under 
this definition 'presents a conjecture-laden inquiry, involving both objective and 
subjective elements.5" State v. Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, \ 6, 63 P.3d 105 (quoting 
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 13035 1307 (Utah App. 1991)). The subjective inquiries are 
"whether the person actually perceived the risk that his or her actions presented and 
whether he or she consciously disregarded it." Id. (citing State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 
881 (Utah 1979)) (emphasis in original). These are questions of the "subjective intent in 
the mind of the actor." Howard, 597 P.2d at 881. A jury may rely on circumstantial 
evidence in determining these questions: "A person's state of mind is not always 
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be 
inferred from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT 
App 289, Tj 10, 988 P.2d 949 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The objective inquiry is "the magnitude of the risk itself." Robinson, 2003 UT 
App 1 at K 6 (citing State v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah App. 1989). Is the risk 
"'of such a degree that an ordinary person would not disregard . . . it'"? Id. (quoting 
State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983)). 
B. The evidence sufficed to support the jury verdict that defendant actually 
perceived the risk that his conduct could cause death or serious bodily injury 
and that he consciously disregarded it 
Here, the evidence more than sufficed to support the jury's determination that 
defendant actually perceived the risk that his conduct could cause death or serious bodily 
injury and that he consciously disregarded it. Defendant repeatedly made jackrabbit 
starts and stops of his truck, speeding up close to Annie before slamming on his brakes. 
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R131:133-39. At least twice defendant came within a few inches of striking her. Id. at 
138-39. Defendant was angry at the time and repeatedly ordered Annie back into the car. 
Id. at 134, 140. He used abusive language throughout the confrontation. Id. at 140. 
Defendant's belligerent and aggressive driving made Annie jump behind obstacles like 
telephone poles to protect herself. Id. at 139. From these circumstances the jury could 
and did reasonably infer that defendant was aware of the risk that his driving could 
seriously injure or kill Annie and that he consciously disregarded it. 
Moreover, not only did defendant drive the truck at a speed so high that, slamming 
on his brakes, he missed Annie by only inches, but he did it in a car that he knew to be 
malfunctioning—a car that could only be stopped by turning off the key. Id. at 189-90, 
195. Defendant's own testimony showed that he understood a good deal about auto 
mechanics in general and about the "stuck accelerator" in particular. Id. at 189-195. 
Further, when accelerating, aiming at Annie, and braking just before impact, 
defendant was driving on the road's gravel shoulder where the surface is especially 
slippery and where skidding is likely. Annie testified, "He [would] slide a little bit, 
because it was gravel and dirt." Id. at 138. "[W]hen he'd slam on the brakes," she could 
"hear the rocks and the dirt... flying." Id. 
Finally, defendant had made specific prior threats to harm Annie with his truck. 
He told Annie on a prior occasion that he would drive his truck "into a telephone pole 
and take [them] both out." Id. at 144. On the day of the incident, he said to her, "[0]ne 
of us [i]s going to get hurt." Id. These additional facts further support the jury's finding 
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that defendant was aware of, but consciously disregarded the risk he caused when he 
approached Annie rapidly with the truck, then slammed on the brakes. 
In sum, a reasonable jury could readily infer from the evidence that defendant was 
not only aware of the risk, but that he consciously disregarded it because he was angry 
and wanted to intimidate and frighten Annie. Further, while defendant claimed below 
that he did not perceive the risk, the jury was entitled assess his credibility and to 
determine that his claim was not truthful. See State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 
App. 1996) ("stating "that determinations regarding witness credibility are solely within 
the jury's province"). The jury chose not to credit defendant's claim that he believed 
himself to be so completely in control of his truck that he did not perceive any risk. 
Thus, the State produced evidence of acts, conduct, statements, and circumstances 
that supported a reasonable inference that defendant did, in fact, perceive the risk, but 
consciously disregarded it. 
C. The evidence sufficed to support the jury verdict that defendant's conduct 
constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise. 
In reaching its verdict, the jury also necessarily found that defendant's conduct 
constituted a risk "of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitute^] a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3). 
The evidence supports this finding. Defendant's claim to the contrary is inadequately 
briefed. He merely claims that the evidence is insufficient and ambiguous and states that 
"the record here supports that [Annie] was not in danger." Br. Appellant at 22. "When a 
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party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [this Court will] decline to reach the merits." 
State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f 12, 69 P.3d 1278. 
In any event, the record supports a finding that Annie was in danger. Defendant 
repeatedly aimed his truck in her direction and accelerated rapidly, slamming on the 
brakes at the last minute. R131:133-39. At least twice, he came within inches of striking 
her. Id. at 138-39. While defendant may argue otherwise, this evidence supports both 
the jury's finding that his conduct created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing 
Annie death or serious bodily injury and its finding that his conduct constituted a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise. 
Defendant claims that evidence of Annie's fear was insufficient to support a 
finding of a substantial risk. Id. at 23. In claiming that Annie's fear was insufficient to 
support a finding of a substantial risk, defendant merely creates and attacks a straw man. 
The "magnitude of the risk" is an objective inquiry. Robinson, 2003 UT App 1 at f 6 
(citing State v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah App. 1989)). The issue is not 
whether Annie believed the risk to be substantial or even whether defendant believed the 
risk to be substantial. The issue is whether the use of a truck as a projectile against an 
unprotected pedestrian is a risk "'of such a degree that an ordinary person would not 
disregard . . . it.'" Id (quoting State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983)). Moreover, 
there need be no showing of actual physical harm or even extremely dangerous conduct 
by a defendant. See United States v. Jimenez, 323 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2003). Rather, 
it is the creation of a substantial risk of serious injury that supports a conviction for 
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reckless endangerment. Id. (noting that leading police on high speed chase of itself 
supports finding of reckless endangerment). 
Ordinary people understand that trucks and cars are dangerous machines. 
Ordinary people do not aim trucks and cars at pedestrians, speeding toward them and 
then slamming on the brakes at the last minute. The jury properly determined that the 
risk created by defendant's behavior was a risk so substantial that an ordinary person 
would not disregard it. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
2
 Utah courts have dealt with gross deviations from the standard of care in a 
number of cases, mostly in the context of manslaughter convictions and negligent 
homicide cases. Those cases have involved various risks: placing a rattlesnake on a 
child's shoulder, State v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523 (Utah App. 1989) (manslaughter); 
failing to hospitalize a home-delivered premature baby showing signs or respiratory 
distress syndrome, State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991) (negligent homicide); 
shooting at police dogs where shots could easily have reached an occupied building, State 
v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991) (manslaughter); and using the palm to strike 
an infant in the chest with adult force, State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1993) 
(manslaughter). 
While Utah appellate courts have hot addressed the risk associated with the use of 
an automobile as a projectile, appellate courts in other jurisdictions have upheld jury 
determinations that such a risk is substantial and unjustifiable and that it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would use. See, e.g., State v. 
Hazeltine, 2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (memorandum decision) 
(attached in Addendum) (upholding conviction for reckless endangerment where angry 
defendant drove car toward others in parking lot, but stopped shortly before hitting them). 
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Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 
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STATE of Tennessee 
v. 
Shawn Edward HAZELTINE. 
No. M2003-01292-CCA-R3-CD. 
Assigned on Briefs April 6, 2004. 
May 17,2004. 
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marshall 
County; No. 15272; Charles Lee, Judge. 
Hayley E. Fults, Shelbyville, Tennessee (on appeal) 
and Andrew Hoover. Pulaski, Tennessee (at trial) for 
the appellant, Shawn Edward Hazeltine. 
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; J. 
Ross Dyer, Assistant Attorney General; William 
Michael McCown, District Attorney General; 
Weakley E. Barnard, Assistant District Attorney 
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 
ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER. J., delivered the 
opinion of the court, in which GARY R WADE. P.J. 
and ALAN E. GLENN. J., joined. 
OPINION 
ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER. J. 
*1A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, 
Shawn Edward Hazeltine, of three counts of 
aggravated assault and three counts of reckless 
endangerment. The trial court merged the reckless 
endangerment convictions with the aggravated 
assault convictions and then sentenced the Defendant 
to an aggregate seven years and seven months in 
prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) 
insufficient evidence exists to support the 
convictions; (2) the trial court erred in not 
consolidating the three counts of reckless 
endangerment; and (3) the trial court erred by not 
ordering alternative sentencing and by ordering 
consecutive sentencing. We conclude that sufficient 
evidence exists in the record to support the 
Defendant's convictions and that the trial court did 
not err in sentencing the Defendant. However, we 
conclude that the trial court erred by failing to 
consolidate the three reckless endangerment 
convictions into one conviction. We further conclude 
that the trial court erred by entering a judgment form 
for Count 2 showing a conviction for reckless 
aggravated assault, because the trial court dismissed 
Count 2 of the indictment. Therefore, we remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I. Facts 
This case arises from an incident that occurred 
during the early morning hours of November 3, 2002, 
in the parking lot of a bar located in Marshall County. 
The Defendant, angry from altercations in the bar and 
the parking lot, drove his car toward the manager of 
the bar and another man and stopped shortly before 
hitting them. The Defendant then backed his car up, 
drove toward the men again and hit Martie 
Gottschalk, a designated driver who had just left the 
bar. A jury convicted the Defendant of three counts 
of aggravated assault and three counts of reckless 
endangerment. The trial court merged the reckless 
endangerment convictions with the aggravated 
assault convictions and then sentenced the Defendant 
to an aggregate seven years and seven months in 
prison. The Defendant now appeals. 
A. Trial 
The following evidence was presented at the 
Defendant's trial. Keith Jolley, a deputy with the 
Marshall County Sheriffs Department, testified that 
he responded to a call to assist a person at Big Jim's 
Country, a bar located on Highway 50 in Marshall 
County, on November 3, 2002, at 2:11 a.m. Deputy 
Jolley stated that he saw a woman named Martie 
Gottschalk lying on the ground in the gravel parking 
lot of the bar, and then the paramedics arrived and 
took her to the hospital. He explained that he asked 
witnesses at the scene what had happened and 
learned that a car struck Gottschalk in the parking lot. 
The deputy testified that the Defendant's brother, Les 
Hazeltine, told him that the Defendant's car hit 
Gottschalk and then gave him a description of the 
car. The deputy confirmed that the car's license plate 
was registered to the Defendant. Deputy Jolley stated 
that he contacted his dispatcher and requested that an 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in S.W.3d Page 2 
2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn.Crim.App.) 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn.Crim.App.)) 
alert be put out for the Defendant's red Ford Escort. 
*2 Betty Prince, a bartender and cook at Big Jim's 
Country, testified that she tended the bar in the early 
morning hours of November 3, 2002, and stayed until 
closing. She testified that she observed the Defendant 
playing pool that evening. Betty Prince explained 
that, as she was cleaning up the bar at about 1:45 
a.m., the Defendant threw a beer bottle at the bar cash 
register and it almost hit her. She reported that she 
immediately called for security to escort the 
Defendant out of the bar, stating, "Grab him. He 
threw a beer bottle." She explained that, after 
throwing the beer bottle, the Defendant walked 
swiftly toward the door of the bar because "[h]e 
want[ed] to get out of there." Betty Prince testified 
that her son, Jerry Prince, was the manager of the bar 
that night and he followed the Defendant out of the 
bar. She stated that she did not leave the bar area 
after calling for security and did not see what 
happened in the parking lot. 
Kelly Clark, a bartender at Big Jim's Country, 
testified that she tended the bar with Betty Prince 
during the early morning hours of November 3, 2002. 
Clark stated that she served the Defendant a drink in 
the pool room, and he made a pass at her. She 
reported that she saw the Defendant throw a beer 
bottle toward the bar and then saw him walk toward 
the exit. She explained, "He hesitated going toward 
the door, looking back to see if the other two 
gentlemen that he had thrown the beer bottle at [were 
going] to take off after him...." Clark testified that 
Jerry Prince followed the Defendant outside into the 
parking lot. 
Jerry Prince, the manager of Big Jim's Country, 
testified that he supervised security during the early 
morning hours of November 3, 2002. He explained 
that, as security at the bar, it was his duty to decide 
whether trouble-makers in the bar should leave the 
premises. He stated that he saw the Defendant near 
the bar earlier that evening but did not see the 
Defendant throw the beer bottle. Jerry Prince 
explained that, at around 2:00 a.m., he heard a beer 
bottle shatter, and then his mother, Betty Prince, 
pointed at the Defendant and yelled, "He threw 
something." He stated that he then saw the Defendant 
running out the front door. Jerry Prince testified that 
he ran after the Defendant and stopped him in the 
parking lot next to the bar. He testified that a group 
of men came out of the bar and into the parking lot 
with him, including Donnie Locke, Beau Schillig and 
Marty Parrish. He stated that he asked the Defendant 
why he threw the beer bottle, and the Defendant 
replied, "They called me a queer." Jerry Prince 
reported that he told the Defendant that he almost hit 
his mother, Betty Prince, with the beer bottle and 
then told him, "Get in your car and just leave." He 
stated that, after he told the Defendant to leave, the 
Defendant "got mad and ... jumped in his car." Jerry 
Prince reported that the Defendant's car was a red 
Ford Escort. He explained, "After [the Defendant] got 
in the car, he started the car up, rolled the window 
down, and said, 'I will get you guys.' " Jerry Prince 
stated that the Defendant was looking at him and 
Schillig when he made that statement. He stated that 
he replied to the Defendant, "Just get out of here." 
*3 Jerry Prince testified that the Defendant then 
"[took] off spinning [his] tires, and [made] a big 
turn, spinning [his] tires." He explained that the 
Defendant "made a donut" in the parking lot and then 
accelerated toward him and Schillig. Jerry Prince 
testified that the Defendant's car was accelerating and 
throwing gravel as he drove toward them and then 
stopped a few inches away from Schillig and "about 
ten or fifteen feet" from him. 
Jerry Prince explained that the Defendant then 
backed his car up about twenty-five feet and then 
"came at us again, spinning [his] tires." He stated that 
he and Schillig moved closer to the cars to be "a little 
safer." Jerry Prince explained, "When he started 
coming at us the second time, I saw [Schillig] coming 
off of the ... left-hand ... passenger side.... And then 
he kept on coming. And then I saw [Gottschalk]. I 
didn't know it was [Gottschalk] at first. I saw 
somebody coming off the hood of the car...." He 
stated that the closest the Defendant's car came to 
him the second time was seven to ten feet because "I 
moved away from it, towards the line of cars that 
were parked." He said that both times the Defendant's 
car came toward him, he feared that he was going to 
be injured. Jerry Prince explained that, after the car 
passed him and Schillig, the Defendant's car traveled 
another ten to fifteen feet and he "saw somebody 
coming off of the hood." He said that the Defendant 
was looking straight ahead as he drove his car toward 
him and Schillig the second time. He stated that, after 
the Defendant hit Gottschalk, the Defendant stopped 
his car, backed up and started to drive away. Jerry 
Prince stated that he then ran after the car because 
"[the Defendant] just hit somebody in my parking 
lot." He testified that he attempted to open the 
passenger door to the Defendant's car, but the door 
was locked. He explained, "As the car started leaving, 
I kicked the [passenger] side of the car." He said that 
he kicked the Defendant's car to mark it "so they 
could find it later." He stated that the Defendant's car 
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was "spinning gravel" when he left the parking lot. 
He said that he got a partial license plate number 
from the Defendant's car as it drove away. 
Jerry Prince testified that, after the Defendant drove 
away, he checked on Gottschalk, who was lying on 
the ground. He said that she was "screaming that her 
legs had been broke[n]...." He stated that several 
people were assisting Gottschalk in the parking lot, 
including her brother and Schillig. Jerry Prince 
testified that he then called the ambulance and the 
police about the incident. He said that the police 
questioned him about the incident a few days later. 
Beau Schillig testified that he arrived at his brother's 
engagement party at Big Jim's Country on the 
evening of November 2, 2002, at around 8:30 p.m. 
and stayed until bar closed the next morning. He 
stated that he saw the Defendant at the bar during the 
night, but he did not know him. Schillig said that, 
while he was playing pool in the early morning hours 
of November 3, 2002, he saw the Defendant pick up 
a beer bottle and throw it across the counter of the 
bar, hitting a neon sign and a cash register. He stated 
that the Defendant ran out the front door of the bar 
after he threw the beer bottle. He testified that he 
heard a lady at the bar yell, "Somebody threw a beer 
bottle," and then he saw Jerry Prince follow the 
Defendant out of the bar. Schillig testified that he 
went outside the bar to check on Jerry Prince and to 
see whether he needed assistance with the Defendant. 
He explained that he "[w]ent out there to help [Jerry 
Prince] calm the [Defendant] down." He said that he 
stood next to Jerry Prince as Prince asked the 
Defendant to leave, and the Defendant got into his 
car. Schillig stated that the Defendant "looked like he 
was going out [of the parking lot], and he ended up 
coming towards us." He reported that, as the 
Defendant came toward them in his car, "we trfied] to 
get out of the way." He said that the Defendant's car 
came within two inches of hitting him and he may 
have "scraped by it." Schillig testified that the 
Defendant was "[s]pinning [his] tires and acted like 
he wanted to hit us." He explained that the Defendant 
was "coming at us pretty fast," and he was concerned 
that he might get injured if the Defendant hit him 
with the car. 
*4 Schillig said that, after the Defendant stopped his 
car, he "put[ ] it in reverse and [took] off backwards" 
about ten feet. He stated that the Defendant then 
drove toward Jerry Prince and him again, with his 
tires spinning and "throwing gravel everywhere." He 
said that the Defendant's car came within two feet of 
him on the Defendant's second attempt to hit him, 
and he had to move out of the way to avoid getting 
hit. Schillig testified that he was scared that he would 
be injured if the Defendant hit him, so he jumped out 
of the way of the car. He stated that he heard Jerry 
Prince kick the Defendant's car as it was leaving the 
parking lot. Schillig stated that he did not see the 
Defendant's car hit Gottschalk, but after the 
Defendant sped off and left the parking lot he 
realized that she had been hit. He explained, "I got 
down there and was asking [Gottschalk] if she was 
okay, and just trying to get her to calm down. 
[I][s]tayed over there with her until the ambulance 
got there." Schillig said that Gottschalk appeared to 
be in pain and was "yelling and screaming [that] her 
legs hurt." He explained that Gottschalk was his 
designated driver and was "going to [drive] me 
home." 
Martie Gottschalk testified that she attended an 
engagement party for Schillig's brother at Big Jim's 
Country on the evening of November 2, 2002. She 
stated that she agreed to be the designated driver for 
Schillig because "he had been drinking a little bit and 
[Schillig's parents] didn't want him driving...." She 
said that, during the early morning hours of 
November 3, 2002, "[tjhere was a fight or 
confrontation inside. I was on the other side [of the 
bar]. And somebody said that [Schillig] had gotten 
thrown out." Gottschalk explained that she went 
outside to get Schillig "because we had to [drive] him 
home." She testified, "I went out the front door and 
turned back to my left and went back toward the back 
[of the building]. Back there I could see there was a 
crowd ... and I assumed it was [Schillig]. And I just 
went toward them to go get him." Gottschalk 
explained that she walked past two rows of cars and 
"then the next thing I know is I[saw] headlights." She 
said that the car was coming at her fast and she 
"didn't have time to think." She stated that she could 
not remember the car hitting her and realized that she 
was on the ground in the parking lot. She explained, 
"I must have blacked out because when I woke up, I 
was in the ambulance." She said that her right knee 
"was hurting pretty good. They told me that I had 
been hit." Gottschalk testified that, in addition to her 
knee, her stomach was sore from being hit by the car. 
She stated that the ambulance took her to the hospital 
for treatment. She explained that she had to wear a 
strap-on cast on her right leg for about three weeks 
and had to use crutches during that time. Gottschalk 
said that she no longer has any problems with her 
knee. 
Ryan Derryberry, Gottschalk's older brother, 
testified that he attended the engagement party with 
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Gottschalk at Big Jim's Country on the evening of 
November 2, 2002. He stated that he followed 
Gottschalk outside into the parking lot at around 2:00 
a.m. on November 3, 2002, because "I knew there 
was some trouble starting." He explained that she was 
about fifty yards in front of him in the parking lot. 
Derryberry stated that he suddenly saw Gottschalk in 
the headlights of a car, and then the car hit her. He 
said that he caught a glimpse of a "reddish-maroonish 
car" backing up, and then ran directly to Gottschalk, 
who was lying in the parking lot. He explained that 
she was "on the ground, screaming in pain," so he 
held her and placed his sweater underneath her head. 
He said that he followed her to the hospital and then 
brought her home. 
*5 Marty Parrish testified that he was at Big Jim's 
Country during the early morning hours of November 
3, 2002, and witnessed Gottschalk being hit by a car. 
He said that he went outside because he saw 
"everybody going toward the door, and I knew 
something was going on, so I went out there." He 
stated that, when the car hit her, she "went on the 
hood ... [a]nd then he slammed on the brakes, and she 
fell off on the ground." Parrish said that, after hitting 
Gottschalk, the driver "put it in reverse and backed 
up and took off." He reported that the car that hit 
Gottschalk was a red Ford Escort. He stated that he 
wrote the license plate number on his hand and then 
gave it to the police when they arrived at the scene. 
The Defendant testified that he arrived at Big Jim's 
Country at about 10:00 p.m. on November 2, 2002, 
with his brother and his brother's wife to celebrate 
their anniversary. He stated that he had about five or 
six beers over the course of the evening. The 
Defendant reported that, while he was sitting with his 
brother near the pool tables, a man playing pool said 
to the Defendant, "What are you, some kind of 
queer?" He explained, "I was kind of mad about it so 
I picked up a beer bottle. Yes, I did throw a beer 
bottle.... It was stupid of me to do [it]. I should have 
never [done] it. [I][t]hen proceeded to run out of the 
bar." The Defendant stated that he ran out of the bar 
"because I knew I had made a bad mistake, and I was 
more than likely going to get in trouble for it, so I just 
wanted to leave." He testified that, as he ran out to his 
car, Jerry Prince was running after him. The 
Defendant said that he unlocked his car, got inside 
and then locked the car. He explained that Jerry 
Prince "was not a happy person. He was mad. I knew 
he was trying to come after me. I didn't know at the 
time that the beer bottle had almost hit his mother, 
and I am very sorry for that.... I was just trying to get 
out of there." The Defendant explained that he could 
not understand what Jerry Prince was yelling at him 
in the parking lot. The Defendant said that he would 
have stayed at the bar and apologized for throwing 
the beer bottle if he had known that it almost hit 
Betty Prince. 
The Defendant testified that, as he was backing up 
his car, Jerry Prince attempted to open his car doors 
on the driver's side and then on the passenger's side. 
The Defendant said that Jerry Prince kicked his car as 
he drove away. He explained, "I didn't see Ms. 
Gottschalk out there.... I did not hit [anybody]. If I 
did [hit somebody,] I would have stopped. I am not 
that kind of person. I would [not] have just ... run 
somebody down and [then left] them there." The 
Defendant said, "If [Gottschalk] was hit by my 
vehicle, I never knew it. I had no idea. And that is 
why I just proceeded to leave." The Defendant 
testified that Jerry Prince stood in front of his car at 
one point, and he backed the car away from him in an 
attempt to leave. The Defendant denied using his car 
as a weapon against Jerry Prince and Schillig, stating, 
"I have never intentionally tried to run anybody 
down." He explained, "I just wanted to leave the bar, 
and I didn't want to get in [any] trouble. That is all I 
wanted to do." He denied "cutting donuts" in the 
parking lot because "if anybody knows anything 
about a front-wheel drive car, you cannot cut a donut 
in it. I wasn't sliding around." The Defendant also 
denied telling Jerry Prince, "I am going to get you." 
He stated that he kept his windows rolled up and did 
not say anything to Jerry Prince or anyone else. 
*6 The Defendant testified that, as he drove through 
the parking lot to leave, "I was kind of going a little 
bit fast, but I wasn't going that fast. I mean, I didn't 
have ... the accelerator pushed all of the way down to 
the floor." He stated that he believed that he did not 
hit anybody that night. He explained, "I know [I] 
made a mistake throwing the beer bottle, but I did not 
knowingly and intentionally try to run somebody 
down out there in that parking lot, especially a 
woman. I wouldn't even raise my hand to a woman, 
much less try to run her down with a car." 
On cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that 
he was convicted of aggravated burglary and theft on 
February 20, 1997. He denied hitting Gottschalk in 
the parking lot with his car. The Defendant stated 
that, at the bar, he "had a buzz," and he was mad at 
the two men at the pool tables because they called 
him a "queer," so he threw a beer bottle at them. The 
Defendant explained that he wanted to hit them with 
the beer bottle, and he admitted that he committed a 
crime by throwing the bottle at the men. He stated 
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that he waited until he was on the other side of the 
bar to throw the beer bottle. The Defendant said that 
he did not try to run over Jerry Prince and Schillig 
and did not threaten them in any way. He stated that 
he was not "spinning gravel" as he left the parking 
lot. He testified that he looked out of the windshield 
as he drove his car forward in the parking lot and 
never saw Gottschalk. 
Before submitting the case to the jury, the trial court 
dismissed Count 2 of the indictment, which charged 
the Defendant with aggravated assault for placing 
Gottschalk in reasonable fear of imminent bodily 
injury through the use or display of a deadly weapon. 
Thereafter, the jury convicted the Defendant of one 
count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D 
felony, two counts of intentional or knowing 
aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and three counts 
of reckless endangerment, Class E felonies. 
B. Sentencing Hearing 
The following evidence was presented at the 
Defendant's sentencing hearing. The State introduced 
the Defendant's pre-sentence report into evidence. 
Jim Grimes, a supervisor in the probation and parole 
department for the State of Tennessee, testified that 
the Defendant had twelve prior misdemeanor 
convictions and one felony conviction in Giles 
County between 1994 and 1999. Grimes stated that 
the Defendant had been placed on probation 
approximately ten times during that time period, and 
the Defendant had a total of three revocation warrants 
"that were filed against him and sustained." He 
testified that the Defendant had failed to pay $2,598 
in "balance dues" for his misdemeanor cases in Giles 
County. Grimes stated that the victim asked for 
$1,000 in restitution for her injuries. He testified that 
the Defendant had been convicted of assault on two 
previous occasions. Grimes said that the Defendant 
reported a history of drinking alcohol and using 
marijuana and crack cocaine. On cross-examination, 
Grimes stated that the victims in the Defendant's case 
showed little interest in the Defendant's sentencing. 
He testified that the Defendant expressed remorse for 
hitting Gottschalk in the parking lot. 
*7 James Edward Hazeltine, the Defendant's father, 
testified that the Defendant had an alcohol problem 
when he was younger. He stated that he put the 
Defendant in a rehabilitation center in Knoxville, 
and, when the Defendant returned home, "He was 
doing a lot better...." James Hazeltine testified that 
the Defendant has lived with him for most of the 
Defendant's life. He said that the Defendant worked 
for Valley Packaging in Pulaski in November of 
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2002. He explained that the Defendant "was moving 
right along up the ladder there." James Hazeltine 
reported that the Defendant has not been convicted of 
any crimes from 1999 to the present. He testified that, 
if the trial court placed the Defendant on probation, 
the Defendant would reside at his house. 
Tracy Mitchell, the Defendant's sister, testified that 
the Defendant "baby-sits for me any time I work 
during the weekends, when he is off work." She said 
that she has no hesitation about leaving her child 
alone with the Defendant. Les Hazeltine, the 
Defendant's brother, testified that the Defendant went 
to drug and alcohol rehabilitation and turned his life 
around. He explained, "It was night and day. I mean, 
when he got out [of rehabilitation], he got a good job. 
He had a steady job, worked hard every day .... and 
he was an upstanding citizen." Les Hazeltine said 
that, if the Defendant was placed on probation, he 
was certain that the Defendant would follow all of the 
requirements of probation. On cross-examination, he 
testified that he accompanied the Defendant to Big 
Jim's Country on November 2, 2002. Les Hazeltine 
stated that the Defendant was not drunk, but he had 
"a good buzz going" at the bar. 
Following the presentation of this evidence, the trial 
court merged the three reckless endangerment 
convictions with the corresponding three aggravated 
assault convictions for each victim. The record shows 
that the trial court included an additional judgment 
form for Count 2, reckless aggravated assault, with 
the notation, "Merge with Count One," even though 
the trial court dismissed Count 2 before submitting 
the case to the jury. 
After considering the evidence presented at the 
sentencing hearing, the trial court found the 
following enhancement factors to be applicable to the 
Defendant's convictions pursuant to Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 40-35- 114 f 1997 & Supp.2002): 
(2) The defendant has a previous history of 
criminal convictions or criminal behavior in 
addition to those necessary to establish the 
appropriate range;... 
(9) The defendant has a previous history of 
unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a 
sentence involving release in the community; ... 
[and] 
(17) The crime was committed under 
circumstances under which the potential for bodily 
injury to a victim was great... 
The trial court found that no mitigating factors 
applied to the Defendant's case. The trial court then 
determined that consecutive sentencing was 
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appropriate under Tennessee Code Annotated section 
40-35-115(b)(2) 0997 & Supp.2002) because it 
found that the Defendant "is an offender whose 
record of criminal activity is extensive." Thereafter, 
the trial court imposed the following sentences: two 
years and nine months for reckless aggravated 
assault; and four years and ten months for each 
remaining conviction of aggravated assault, to be 
served concurrently with each other, but 
consecutively to the sentence for reckless aggravated 
assault. The trial court then denied the Defendant's 
request for alternative sentencing, finding that the 
Defendant was not a good candidate for alternative 
sentencing "because of the numerous times that the 
[Defendant has been placed on probation ... and the 
revocations which he suffered in the past." The trial 
court further found that alternative sentencing was 
not appropriate because of "the [Defendant's past 
failures at rehabilitation, and apparently his present 
failure at rehabilitation." The Defendant now appeals. 
II. Analysis 
*8 On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) 
insufficient evidence exists to support his 
convictions; (2) the trial court erred in not 
consolidating the three counts of reckless 
endangerment; and (3) the trial court erred by not 
ordering alternative sentencing and by ordering 
consecutive sentencing. 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
First, the Defendant contends that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support his 
convictions for aggravated assault and reckless 
endangerment. When an accused challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court's 
standard of review is whether, after considering the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Term. R.App. P. 13(e): Jackson v. 
Virginia. 443 U.S. 307. 324 (1979): State v. Smith. 24 
S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tenn.2000). This rule applies to 
findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, 
circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both 
direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. 
Penderzrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1999). 
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this 
Court should not re-weigh or re-evaluate the 
evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1990). Nor may this Court substitute 
its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from 
the evidence. State v. Buggs. 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 
(Tenn.1999): Liakas v. State, 286 S.W.2d 856. 859 
(Tenn.1956). Questions concerning the credibility of 
the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, 
as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are 
resolved by the trier of fact. Liakas. 286 S.W.2d at 
859. This Court must afford the State of Tennessee 
the strongest legitimate view of the evidence 
contained in the record, as well as all reasonable 
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. 
State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn.1992). 
Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant 
removes the presumption of innocence and raises a 
presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal 
defendant bears the burden of showing that the 
evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty 
verdict. Id. 
1. Aggravated Assault 
A person commits aggravated assault who: 
(1) Intentionally or knowingly commits an assault 
as defined in § 39-13-101 and: 
(A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(B) Uses or displays a deadly weapon; or 
(2) Recklessly commits an assault as defined in § 
39-13-101(a)(l),and: 
(A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(B) Uses or displays a deadly weapon. 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(l), (2) (1997 & 
Supp.2002). Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-
13-101(a)(1997) states that a person commits assault 
who: "(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
causes bodily injury to another; (2) Intentionally or 
knowingly causes another to reasonably fear 
imminent bodily injury; or (3) Intentionally or 
knowingly causes physical contact with another and a 
reasonable person would regard the contact as 
extremely offensive or provocative." "Deadly 
weapon" means "[a]nything that in the manner of its 
use or intended use is capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-
106(a)(5)(B) (1997). "Bodily injury" includes "a cut, 
abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement; physical pain 
or temporary illness or impairment of the function of 
a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(2). 
*9 In this case, the Defendant was convicted for 
reckless aggravated assault for recklessly causing 
bodily injury to Gottschalk while using a deadly 
weapon. The Defendant also was convicted for two 
counts of aggravated assault for intentionally or 
knowingly causing Jerry Prince and Schillig to 
reasonably fear imminent bodily injury while using a 
deadly weapon. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, the proof showed 
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that the Defendant got into his car in the parking lot 
and told Jerry Prince, "I will get you guys." The 
Defendant then "cut a donut" in the parking lot and 
then "spun gravel" as he accelerated toward Jerry 
Prince and Schillig. The Defendant's car stopped a 
few inches from Schillig, and then the Defendant 
backed his car up about twenty-five feet in the 
parking lot. The Defendant then "spun gravel" again 
as he accelerated toward Jerry Prince and Schillig a 
second time. Jerry Prince and Schillig managed to 
dodge the Defendant's car, but the Defendant hit 
Gottschalk as she was crossing the parking lot, 
causing Gottschalk severe pain in her right leg and 
requiring her to wear a strap-on cast for about three 
weeks. Jerry Prince and Schillig testified that they 
feared bodily injury as the Defendant drove toward 
them on both occasions. The "deadly weapon" in this 
case was the Defendant's car, which was capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury if it were to hit 
a person. Based upon this evidence, we conclude that 
a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant committed reckless 
aggravated assault against Gottschalk and aggravated 
assault against Jerry Prince and Schillig. 
2. Reckless Endangerment 
A person commits reckless endangerment "who 
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may 
place another person in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily injury." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-
103(a) (1997). Reckless endangerment committed 
with a deadly weapon is a Class E felony. Tenn.Code 
Ann. § 39-13- 103(b). "Reckless" refers to a person 
"who acts recklessly with respect to circumstances 
surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct 
when the person is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur." 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-ll-106fa)(31). The risk "must 
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all 
the circumstances as viewed from the accused 
person's standpoint." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-
103(a)(31). 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the evidence shows that the Defendant 
recklessly drove his vehicle at a high rate of speed in 
the parking lot of Big Jim's Country, thereby placing 
other people in the parking lot in imminent danger of 
death or serious bodily injury. The Defendant almost 
hit Jerry Prince and Schillig and struck Gottschalk 
during the course of his reckless driving in the 
parking lot. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant was guilty of recklessly endangering 
Gottschalk, Jerry Prince and Schillig. However, 
because of our holding with respect to the 
Defendant's second issue, we reverse the trial court's 
judgments for Counts 5 and 7 showing the 
convictions of reckless endangerment upon Jerry 
Prince and Schillig. 
B. Consolidation of Reckless Endangerment 
Convictions 
*10 The Defendant next contends that the trial court 
erred in not consolidating the three counts of reckless 
endangerment since they arose from the Defendant's 
single act of driving. The State concedes in its 
appellate brief that the Defendant's convictions for 
reckless endangerment upon Jerry Prince and Schillig 
must be merged into a single count, but the State 
argues that the conviction for reckless endangerment 
upon Gottschalk must stand. The State contends that 
the Defendant committed two separate acts of 
reckless endangerment in the parking lot because he 
drove toward Jerry Prince and Schillig, backed up 
and then drove at them again, hitting Gottschalk. We 
agree with the Defendant. 
In State v. Ramsey. 903 S.W.2d 709, 713 
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1995), this Court held that, in 
certain circumstances, a defendant's continuous 
operation of a vehicle may only result in one act of 
reckless endangerment under the statute. This Court 
noted that "the fact that the reckless endangerment 
statute speaks in terms of a person recklessly 
engaging in conduct indicates that a course of 
conduct, comprised of several acts, would constitute 
the offense." Ramsey, 903 S.W.2d at 713; see also 
State v. Davis. 654 S.W.2d 688, 696 
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1983) (holding that if the statute 
prohibits a course of conduct, as opposed to 
individual acts, then there can be only one conviction 
even though several acts constituting the course of 
conduct may be proven). However, this Court 
declined to "fashion a blanket rule that provides that a 
defendant's continuous operation of a vehicle may 
only result in one act of reckless endangerment under 
the statute. Many scenarios could be created where 
such a rule would not be prudent." Ramsey, 903 
S.W.2d at 713. Instead, the determination of whether 
the continuous operation of a vehicle may constitute 
one act of reckless endangerment depends upon the 
unique facts of each case. Id 
In Ramsey, the defendant was speeding in his car 
along a two lane road and veered into the oncoming 
lane, nearly hitting a pick-up truck traveling in that 
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lane. Id at 711. The defendant continued speeding 
and veered into the oncoming lane again, colliding 
with a second pick-up truck. Id The defendant was 
convicted of three counts of reckless endangerment 
for three separate victims. Id. This Court determined 
that, under those facts, the trial court should have 
merged the three counts of reckless endangerment 
into one. This Court explained: 
Due to the very short distance between the two 
trucks and the very short amount of time that 
passed between swerving into the oncoming lane of 
traffic in front of the Tripletts and the crash with 
Mr. Story, the reckless conduct engaged in by the 
defendant was one continuous act, a single course 
of conduct, and therefore supports only one 
conviction for that act. In this case, ... we find that 
although the defendant's reckless conduct 
victimized more than one person, it does not justify 
multiple convictions. 
*HA£at713. 
In this case, the evidence shows that the Defendant 
"cut a donut" in the parking lot and then "spun 
gravel" as he accelerated toward Jerry Prince and 
Schillig. The Defendant's car stopped a few inches 
from Schillig, and then the Defendant backed his car 
up about twenty-five feet in the parking lot. The 
Defendant then "spun gravel" again as he accelerated 
toward Jerry Prince and Schillig a second time. Jerry 
Prince and Schillig managed to dodge the 
Defendant's car, but the Defendant hit Gottschalk as 
she was crossing the parking lot. The facts of this 
case are similar to the facts in Ramsey because these 
events occurred during a very short period of time, 
and the victims were within close physical proximity 
of each other. We conclude that, under these facts, 
the reckless conduct engaged in by the Defendant 
was one continuous act, a single course of conduct, 
and, therefore, supports only one conviction for that 
act. Although the Defendant's reckless conduct 
victimized more than one person, we conclude that it 
does not justify multiple convictions. Accordingly, 
we reverse the trial court's judgments for Counts 5 
and 7 showing the convictions of reckless 
endangerment upon Jerry Prince and Schillig. 
After thoroughly examining the record in this case, 
we also conclude that the trial court erred as to Count 
2 by entering a judgment form for Count 2 showing a 
conviction for reckless aggravated assault with the 
notation, "Merge with Count One." Before the trial 
court submitted the case to the jury, the trial court 
dismissed Count 2 of the indictment. The jury 
convicted the Defendant of one count of reckless 
aggravated assault. Therefore, we remand the case to 
the trial court to enter an order vacating this 
extraneous judgment pertaining to Count 2. 
G. Sentencing 
Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court 
erred in sentencing the Defendant. The trial court 
imposed the following sentences: two years and nine 
months for reckless aggravated assault; and four 
years and ten months for each conviction of 
aggravated assault, to be served concurrently with 
each other, but consecutively to the sentence for 
reckless aggravated assault. Specifically, the 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
imposing consecutive sentencing and denying his 
request for alternative sentencing. The State contends 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
ordering consecutive sentencing because the 
Defendant has an extensive history of criminal 
activity. The State also argues that the trial court 
properly denied the Defendant's request for 
alternative sentencing because the Defendant's 
probation has been revoked more than once in the 
past, and he has failed at his attempts to rehabilitate 
himself. We agree with the State. 
When a defendant challenges the length and manner 
of service of a sentence, it is the duty of this court to 
conduct a de novo review on the record with a 
presumption that "the determinations made by the 
court from which the appeal is taken are correct." 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (2003). This 
presumption is "conditioned upon the affirmative 
showing in the record that the trial court considered 
the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and 
circumstances." State v. Ross. 49 S.W.3d 833, 847 
(Tenn.200n: State v. Pettus. 986 S.W.2d 540, 543 
(Tenn.1999): State v. Ashbv. 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 
(Tenn.1990. The presumption does not apply to the 
legal conclusions reached by the trial court in 
sentencing a defendant or to the determinations made 
by the trial court which are predicated upon 
uncontroverted facts. State v. Dean. 76 S.W.3d 352, 
377 (Tenn.Crim.App.200n; State v. Butler. 900 
S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994): State v. 
Smith 891 S.W.2d 922. 929 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994). 
In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, we 
must consider: (a) any evidence received at the trial 
and/or sentencing hearing; (b) the presentence report; 
(c) the principles of sentencing; (d) the arguments of 
counsel relative to sentencing alternatives; (e) the 
nature and characteristics of the offense; (f) any 
mitigating or enhancement factors; (g) any statements 
made by the defendant on his or her own behalf; and 
(h) the defendant's potential or lack of potential for 
rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-
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210 (2003); State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400. 411 
fTenn.CrimApp.2001). The party challenging a 
sentence imposed by the trial court has the burden of 
establishing that the sentence is erroneous. 
Tenn.Code Ann. $ 40-35-401. Sentencing 
Commission Cmts. 
*12 A defendant is eligible for alternative sentencing 
if the sentence actually imposed is eight years or less. 
Tenn.Code Ann. S 40-35- 303(a) (2003). A 
defendant who is an especially mitigated or standard 
offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony is 
presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative 
sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102(b)(6). In 
determining whether to grant or deny probation, the 
trial court may consider the following: the 
circumstances of the offense; the defendant's criminal 
record; background and social history; the 
defendant's physical and mental health; the deterrent 
effect on other criminal activity; and the likelihood 
that probation is in the best interests of both the 
public and the defendant. State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 
945. 958 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1996). The Defendant 
bears the burden of establishing suitability for 
probation. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b): Ashbv, 
823S.W.2datl69. 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1) 
(1997) states that: 
Sentences involving confinement should be based 
on the following considerations: (A) Confinement 
is necessary to protect society by restraining a 
defendant who has a long history of criminal 
conduct; (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid 
depreciating the seriousness of the offense or 
confinement is particularly suited to provide an 
effective deterrence to others likely to commit 
similar offenses; or (C) Measures less restrictive 
than confinement have frequently or recently been 
applied unsuccessfully to the defendant;.... 
Additionally, "[t]he potential or lack of potential for 
the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant should 
be considered in determining the sentence alternative 
or length of a term to be imposed...." Tenn.Code Ann. 
§ 40-35- 103(5). The trial court may consider 
mitigating factors and enhancement factors when 
determining a defendant's sentence. Tenn.Code Ann. 
§ $ 40-35-113. - 114. A trial court may order 
sentences to run consecutively if a defendant is 
charged with more than one criminal offense and it 
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one or 
more of several criteria are met as set forth in 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115 
(1997). State v. Kern, 909 S.W.2d 5. 8 
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1993). These criteria include a 
finding by the trial court that the defendant is "an 
offender whose record of criminal activity is 
extensive." Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2). 
Whether sentences are to be served consecutively or 
concurrently is a matter within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. State v. James, 688 S.W.2d 463. 
465 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1984). 
In this case, after considering the evidence presented 
at the sentencing hearing, the trial court found the 
following enhancement factors to be applicable to the 
Defendant's convictions pursuant to Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 40-35-114: 
(2) The defendant has a previous history of 
criminal convictions or criminal behavior in 
addition to those necessary to establish the 
appropriate range;... 
*13 (9) The defendant has a previous history of 
unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a 
sentence involving release in the community; ... 
[and] 
(17) The crime was committed under 
circumstances under which the potential for bodily 
injury to a victim was great;... 
The trial court found that no mitigating factors 
applied to the Defendant's case. The trial court then 
determined that consecutive sentencing was 
appropriate under Tennessee Code Annotated section 
40-35-115(b)(2) because it found that the Defendant 
"is an offender whose record of criminal activity is 
extensive." The trial court then denied the 
Defendant's request for alternative sentencing, 
finding that the Defendant was not a good candidate 
for alternative sentencing "because of the numerous 
times that the [Defendant has been placed on 
probation ... and the revocations which he suffered in 
the past." The trial court further found that alternative 
sentencing was not appropriate because of "the 
[Defendant's past failures at rehabilitation, and 
apparently his present failure at rehabilitation." 
On appeal, the Defendant does not contest the trial 
court's imposition of any enhancement factors; 
fFNll rather he challenges the imposition of 
consecutive sentencing and the trial court's denial of 
the Defendant's request for alternative sentencing. 
After thoroughly reviewing the evidence presented at 
the sentencing hearing, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by ordering 
consecutive sentencing in this case. The record shows 
that the Defendant is "an offender whose record of 
criminal activity is extensive." Tenn.Code Ann. § 
40-35-115(b)(2). The Defendant's record shows the 
following convictions: evading arrest; leaving the 
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scene of an accident; two convictions for disorderly 
conduct; two convictions for public intoxication; two 
convictions for vandalism; driving under the 
influence; two convictions for assault; aggravated 
burglary; and theft. These thirteen convictions 
demonstrate that the Defendant has an extensive 
record of criminal activity. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
imposing consecutive sentencing in this case. 
FN1. In his appellate brief, the Defendant 
failed to argue any sentencing issues other 
than whether the trial court 
erred in ordering consecutive sentencing and 
in denying the Defendant's request for 
alternative sentencing. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Defendant has waived any 
other sentencing issues. Tenn. R.App. P. 
13(b); Tenn. R. Ct.Crim.App. 10(b). 
However, we note that the trial court erred 
by applying the enhancement factor that "the 
crime was committed under circumstances 
under which the potential for bodily injury 
to a victim was great." Tenn.Code Ann. § 
40-35-114(17). In State v. Imfeld 70 S.W.3d 
698, 706 (Tenn.20021 the Tennessee 
Supreme Court held that the "potential for 
bodily injury" enhancement factor was 
inapplicable to enhance the sentences for 
aggravated assault because "elements of an 
aggravated assault against a specific, named 
victim are reflected in the statutory language 
of the enhancement factor, thus rendering its 
application to enhance the sentence 
inappropriate." Even if we were to find that 
this issue was not waived, the trial court's 
error in applying this enhancement factor 
would not have resulted in a reduction in the 
Defendant's sentence because the trial court 
properly applied the two other enhancement 
factors. 
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Defendant has been given the opportunity to 
rehabilitate himself under less restrictive means, and 
he has failed to take advantage of these opportunities. 
His actions in the parking lot of Big Jim's Country 
injured Gottschalk and could have seriously injured 
other people in the area. Moreover, the Defendant's 
extensive record of criminal activity indicates that he 
is not a good candidate for alternative sentencing. 
The record fully supports the trial court's findings and 
its determination denying the Defendant an 
alternative sentence. Therefore, we conclude that the 
Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating 
the impropriety of the trial court's denial of 
alternative sentencing. 
III. Conclusion 
*14 In accordance with the foregoing authorities and 
reasoning, we AFFIRM the trial court's judgments for 
Counts 1, 4 and 6, the aggravated assault convictions, 
and for Count 3, the conviction of reckless 
endangerment upon Gottschalk. We REVERSE the 
trial court's judgments for Counts 5 and 7 showing 
the convictions of reckless endangerment upon Jerry 
Prince and Schillig. We REMAND the case to the 
trial court to enter an order vacating the extraneous 
judgment pertaining to Count 2 and for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
2004 WL 1114587 (Tenn.Crim.App.) 
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The Defendant next contends that the trial court 
erred by denying his request for alternative 
sentencing. The trial court found that the Defendant 
was not a good candidate for probation because of his 
prior probation revocations and his past failures at 
rehabilitation. The trial court noted that the 
Defendant "faltered considerably" in his 
rehabilitation on the night of the incident and "[t]hat 
almost caused at least one ... person to be seriously, 
seriously injured, who [did not have a] dog in the 
fight, so to speak. She was just going to her car, and 
the [Defendant recklessly ran over her because of 
this." We agree with the trial court's findings. The 
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